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i. INTRODUCTION
The United States has won the first significant round in the international
battle over genetically modified foods. In May 2006, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) ruled that a European de facto moratorium on the
importation of genetically modified food was illegal. 1 The central
disagreement between the U.S. and E.U. regulators is whether to use
precautionary measures when introducing genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) to the food supply. 2 The United States is unwilling to regulate
scientific research by industries that bring food to market 3 and Europe
couches its concerns in terms of an environment and population
susceptible to the unknown risks of those scientific developments.4
Europe's extreme application of the precautionary principle in its import
ban to protect human health and environment was discredited by the
2006 WTO ruling, creating uncertainty about how governments can
control the risks associated with "novel" foods and genetic material.5
The failure of Europe and the United States to reconcile their positions
on the safety of GMOs arises from diverging cultural attitudes about
1. See Panel Report, European Communities MAfeasures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291. WT/DS292. WT/DS293 (Sept. 29,
2006) [hereinafter Panel Report].
2. Sarah Lively, Comment. The ABCs and NTBs of GMOs: The Great European
Union-United States Trade Debate Do European Restrictions on the Trade of
Genetically Modified Organisms Violate International Trade Law?, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 239, 249-50 (2002).
3. Debra M. Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified
Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167,
186 (2006).
4. Id. at 168.
5. Council Regulation 1829/2003. infra note 76. replaced Council Regulation
258/97, Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, 1997 O.J. (L43), as to the
regulation of GMOs. The WTO ruling will further complicate the E.U.'s regulatory
scheme.
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risk, government regulation, and food.6 The existence of a powerful tort
remedy system in the United States and widespread trust of "agribusiness"
has muted domestic calls for regulation, whereas Europe remains skeptical
of the efficacy of governmental regulation and tied to its heritage of
local farming.7 International negotiators, however, have not explicitly
addressed these hurdles to a consensus.' In fact, a proxy issue has
emerged for the United States and Europe to fight about: the scientific
basis for environmental and health risks posed by GMOs.9
In the face of uncertain and possibly irreversible health and environmental
damage, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development binds
states to adhere to the precautionary principle.' 0 The precautionary principle,
a maxim of evaluating social and economic costs, advocates restraint
when consequences are unforeseeable.' 1 In the spirit of the Rio Declaration,
the European Union unsuccessfully invoked the precautionary principle
in justifying its GMO import moratorium. Failing to summon the
approval of the WTO leaves the principle's future application and use in
determining public policy a cause of debate.' 2
This Comment evaluates the regulation of GMOs in the American and
European food supplies, and the influence of international treaties on
those systems. Operating from the presumption that tort liability can be
inadequate in the face of widespread and irreversible damage, this
analysis will seek to propose a precautionary scheme for managing risk
associated with GMOs. Specifically, this Article will advocate the
development of an international environmental court with the proposed
6. Brian P. Rafferty. Note, The Door Opens Slightly: Recent European Union
Regulations on Genetically Modified Products and the Ongoing United States-European
Union GM Product Dispute. 16 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 281, 282 (2004).
7. Id. at 299-300.
8. Id. at 298.
9. See Cara V. Coburn, Comment, Out of the Petri Dish and Back to the People:
A Cultural Approach to GMO Policy, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 283. 284 (2005).
10. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14,
1992, Resolutions Adapted by the Conference, principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
151/26/Rev. I (Vol. 1), Dec. 1, 1992 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. The Rio Declaration
was created by the U.N. at the Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, to
articulate the principles that humans should adhere to as they continue to develop the
Earth and society. Id. pmbl.
11. The precautionary principle has been articulated most notably in the Rio
Declaration, Principle 15: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage.
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation." Id. principle 15.
12. Coburn, supra note 9, at 286-87.
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goals of maintaining biological diversity and ecosystem stability, and
protecting humans from new allergens and toxins. Promoting these
goals in the international community will require a global commitment
to food product labeling, scientific testing, consumer education, and an
acknowledgement that risk thresholds differ from culture to culture.
This Article begins with a brief summary of the scientific basis of
creating GMOs and its historic precursors. The second section provides
an overview of risks to humans and the environment. The third part of
this Article analyzes the arguments put forward by both the United
States and the E.U., which have defined the conflict between blocs of
countries pushing GMOs abroad and those who persistently reject them.
The fourth section evaluates the respective regulatory schemes imposed
on GMOs by the United States and Europe, domestically and by
international treaty. The success of these systems is evaluated in the fifth
part through a review of the rulings in various WTO and European Court
of Justice (ECJ) cases dealing with GMO trade. The weaknesses built
into each system are evaluated in the sixth section. The inadequacies of
tort liability systems to fully address the problems presented by GMOs
are presented in the seventh section. The eighth section addresses the
failings of the options for environmental adjudication within the context
of the international treaty organizations. Finally, recommendations will
be set forth on the use of scientific testing and labeling to ensure
accountability and recourse for countries that may fall victim to the
unintended consequences of GMO use. Specifically, of utmost importance
is encouraging the use of an adjudicatory body that can weigh
environmental and health risks alongside the policies favoring GMOs.
II. GENE SHARING METHODS
Agricultural breeding is an ancient practice, often explained as crossing
the sweetest fruit tree with its most fertile neighbor. Conventionally,
cross-breeding has been accomplished through the natural process of
relying on bees for cross-pollenization. As scientists began work on
genetic sequencing, genes carrying favorable properties, such as bright
color, were isolated. 3 New techniques were developed for introducing
isolated genes from other species into organisms. 14 These methods have
allowed genes to cross species where they could not do so naturally. 15
The different methods of inserting the new genetic material involve
penetrating the cell wall, by injection, by the creation of pores to allow
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Martin Enserink, Preliminary Data Touch Off Genetic Food Fight, 283 Sci.
1094-95 (1999).
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the genetic material to pass through, or using "bioballistics," where a
gun is used to shoot small amounts of metal covered in DNA into the
cell. 16 The receiving cells often die under the impact of the mechanical
gene insertion. The goal of these methods is to force the attachment of
the genetic material in the cell. However, this happens unpredictably,
sometimes without integration, and sometimes by imprinting multiple
copies of the DNA. " Even a successful integration of the genes that
were harvested for their desirable traits does not guarantee that the traits
will appear as intended in the receiving organism. "8
Another more organic, yet unpredictable and possibly dangerous
method of forcing gene expression, is the use of recombinant DNA.
Scientists harness the ability of plasmids and viruses to carry genetic
material from one organism to another of a different species.' 9 The
specific benefit of using plasmids and viruses is their similarity to bees:
they have a pre-programmed ability to invade cell nuclei and "pollenize"
by laying down new genetic material. These methods assure scientists
that the target will receive and accept the DNA, whereas the mechanical
insertion techniques amount to a game of roulette. With the danger that
the cell will be infected by the virus, the scientists must disable the disease
without disrupting its ability to penetrate the nucleus. 20 However, even
when a virus successfully interferes with the nucleus, expression of the
desired traits is not guaranteed.
Viruses are also used to activate foreign genetic material by instructing
the new genes to begin producing the proteins necessary for trait expression.2'
Industry has tended toward the use of powerful viral promoters, such as
22the cauliflower mosaic virus, to ensure the genes manifest themselves.
This can lead to disproportionate gene expression, where the foreign
16. Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in
Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 271 (2001).
17. Id. at 271 72. The genetic material may be imprinted multiple times in the
intended location, at many different locations, or not at all. The physical evidence of the




21. Id. at 279.
22. Id. Naturally occurring plants have their own viral promoters that control the
activation and manifestation of their genes. When a plant is genetically modified, the new
gene does not carry with it its normal viral promoter, so powerful foreign viral promoters
are attached to the new gene, often leading to more enhanced genetic expression than
normally occurs. Id.
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DNA appears at two or three times the rate of expression of the original
DNA.23 The promoters also are not limited to affecting the foreign DNA;
they can direct the original DNA to produce proteins they normally do
not.24 The result of using viruses and viral promoters to force gene expression
is that their effects are hard to limit, producing plants with uneven
characteristics, sometimes creating cancer.25 These viral promoters are
also instrumental in pushing genetic material into other neighboring
species, making it difficult for the agricultural industry to control the
spread of their GMOs while they are growing in the field.26
III. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
A. Allergens and Immunity
The uncontrolled production of novel proteins in plants has potential
human health implications. As genes from one organism are transferred
to another, new allergenic properties can be unwittingly attached to the
target.2  In the context of a supermarket, where food labels do not
include lists of genetic modifications, people who know of their allergies
will not be equipped to choose foods without the risk of becoming sick.28
Furthermore, the new combinations of genetic material from organisms
not typically found in food make it possible for new allergens to
develop. 29 This makes it especially difficult for sufferers to identify the
cause of sickness.3 ° In 1996, the risks of allergens entering the food
supply without public knowledge was highlighted when a crop of soybeans
modified with genes from a Brazil nut landed on the market. 31 Despite
animal testing for allergens, researchers found that these soybeans activated
reactions in people who had known Brazil nut allergies.32
Antibiotic resistance is another significant problem with the process of
genetic modification. To test the success of an injection of foreign traits,
scientists add an antibiotic resistance gene called a "marker gene" to the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. According to one study, the use of the cauliflower mosaic viral promoter
led to genetic over-expression in the form of a growing cancer. Id. n.57.
26. Id. at 279.




31. Id. With Brazil nut allergies being relatively common, the soybean manufacturer,
Pioneer Hi-Bred, conducted their own animal testing to test for human allergic reactions.
These tests satisfied the FDA testing requirements. It was up to independent researchers
at the University of Nebraska to cast a skeptical eye to these tests. Those tests, on
humans, yielded positive allergy results. Id.
32. Id.
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mix of genes they hope the target will accept.33 After the injection process,
the cell is exposed to an antibiotic.34 If the cell survives exposure to the
antibiotic, the scientists know that the foreign gene insertion was
successful. 35 Conversely, a dead cell is evidence that the cell was not
36
successfully infected with the foreign genes. The risk to humans is that
these live marker genes will be transferred to cellular bacteria and
consumed with other foods, causing people to develop immunities to
31important antibiotics. Scientists have suggested limiting marker genesto diseases that are controlled by out-of-use antibodies.3 8
B. Biodiversity and Gene Flow
The most potent risks of using GMOs come from potential damage to
the environment. 39 The emergence of new traits in food may come at the
expense of the very ecological conditions that allow them to be cultivated.
The natural tendencies of wind and birds to pass seeds between fields
presents a significant challenge to everyone involved in GMO production
and consumption. 40 A well-publicized consequence of planting a field
with GMOs is the potential for those seeds to infect a neighboring crop
that is otherwise free of genetic modification. 41 This danger is enhanced
by the use of viral promoters, with some tests showing that GMO crops
are twenty times more likely to cross-pollinate to other species than their
natural relatives.42
Farmers facing a market of different seed options have many
considerations to weigh. GMO producers, such as Monsanto, have a
proprietary interest in limiting the use of their patented genetic material
to the farmers with whom they enter into agreements. Farmers are
required to satisfy the expectations of their buyers, who may be specifically




37. Id. DNA transfer could occur in humans and animals by eating genetically
modified foods and exposing the bacteria in their mouths to new DNA. This DNA could
latch on to the bacteria, exposing it to the resistance genes contained in the genetic
marker. Such a scenario would make it difficult to control the spread of disease with
antibiotics. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 280.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Kolehmainen, supra note 16, at 280-81.
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buying a crop because it is not genetically modified. They might also be
leery of finding patented genetic material on their property, for fear that
they will become liable to a biotech company under a de facto contract.
Unwarned, consumers are not able to choose what they put in their
bodies. Farmers, likewise, are unable to wholly prevent gene flow. (Can
you add one or two citations to these sentences? Maybe use some
farmer's anecdote and cite to it?)
C. Public and Environmental Health Failures
In 2000, questions concerning the risks of GMOs came to a head when
corn products were recalled due to the presence of Bacillus thuringiensis
(Bt). Bt is a toxin that was used in StarLinkM corn, which had been
approved only for use in animal feed.43 The StarLink seeds eventually
cross-bred with regular corn fields planted nearby, delivering Bt into the
human food supply. 44 Corn taco shells were recalled en masse due to Bt,
which has the potential for causing human allergic reactions. 45 This
incident solidified the connection between GMOs and public health
concerns, leading the government to take action. Some countries now
regulate the side-by-side cultivation of GMO and natural crops by different
farmers, and require "buffer zones" of natural crops around the perimeter of
a grower's property to mitigate seed drift. 46
The most popular forms of GMOs are seeds with built-in resistance to
weeds or insects, such as Roundup Ready@ corn, cotton, and soybeans.
These GMOs integrate natural pesticides and herbicides found in other
plants into the most common and profitable crops grown in the United
States. In the case of Roundup Ready products, the natural weed and
insect repellant are built into the seed, allowing Monsanto's companion
products, Roundup pesticides and herbicides, to attack pests without
damaging the sprayed crops.47 Whereas farmers have traditionally been
43. Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology's [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm
Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH 1, 30 (2006), http://www.vjolt.net/vol 1/
issue2/v I Ii2 a4-Noah.pdf.
44. Id. at30-31.
45. Id.
46. The EPA has used mandatory buffer zones to control the spread of bioengineered
seeds. EPA, Bt Cotton Refuge Requirements for the 2001 Growing Season, http://www.
epa.gov/agriculture/tbio.html#Btcotton. These kinds of extreme regulations are losing
adherents. See Checkbiotech, Hungarian Minister Alludes to Lifting Ban on GM Crops,
June 1, 2008, http:/greenbio. checkbiotech.org/news/2008-03-07/Hungarian minister alludes
to liftingban on GM crops/.
47. Monsanto advertises its Roundup Ready® Corn 2 System as approved for use
in the European Union. explaining that weed control is achieved through "timely
applications and the appropriate rate" of its own herbicides. See Monsanto, Input Traits,
http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/agproducts/input-traits/products/roundup ready_
corn 2.asp. (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). Monsanto has also been developing so-called
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careful to protect the plant from overexposure to chemicals, particularly
to the fruit itself, the integration of these "activator" products at the
genetic level has led growers to spray their crops indiscriminately and
excessively. Thus, consumers face a twofold risk of food with unknowable
long-term genetic effects, and a greater exposure to toxic chemicals used
in the farming process.
IV. ADVERSARIAL POSITIONS ON GMO ACCEPTANCE
In international trade disputes, GMO policy brings together unresolved
scientific issues that do not lend themselves to a conclusive trade policy.
GMOs have been known to cross-pollinate with native species and
threaten the future of valuable plant and insect diversity. 48 They have been
associated with the outbreak of new food allergies, and have aggravated
existing allergies in consumers who were not given notice of the
adjusted genetic properties of widely-used products such as soybeans. 49
Experiments introducing genetically modified foods to rats show a causal
relationship between consumption of GMOs and underdeveloped physiques
and immune systems.50 Finally, the presence of genetically modified
hormones in the meat and dairy supply is believed to raise the risk of
cancer in human consumers.51 On the other hand, GMO proponents
tout the benefits of vitamin-fortified foods and higher crop yields from
pest-resistant plants.52 The different policies taken by the United States
and the E.U. indicate a lack of consensus about how to weigh potential
risks against potential benefits, and the presence of other factors that
bear on government decision making.
A. America: Faith in Companies, FDA
In the United States, there has been overwhelming indifference from
the public and lawmakers on the moral and ethical implications of
Traitor, or T-GURT seeds, which contain genetic properties that can only be activated by
application of a proprietary chemical. See Eshan Masood, Compromise Sought on
Terminator. NATURE. June 24, 1999, at 399. 721.
48. Ronnie Cummins, Organic Consumers Ass'n, Hazards of Genetically Engineered
Food and Crops: Why We Need a Global Moratorium, http://www.organicconsumers.
org/GEFacts.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
49. Id.
50. See Enserink, supra note 15, at 1094-95.
51. See Cummins, supra note 48, at 2.
52. JAY WEINSTEIN, THE ETHICAL GOURMET 99 (2006).
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genetically engineering food. Americans are accustomed to purchasing
and eating foods pre-processed and treated with chemicals by the same
large companies that are developing GMOs.53 This acceptance is a stark
contrast to the ongoing public discussion about the consequences of
using gene technology to design human babies or engage in stem cell
research.54 These differing reactions to similar activities is consistent
with a cultural predisposition to convenience and control. The willingness
of the American public to consume almost anything that appears in a
supermarket is the result of widespread confidence in the safety protocols of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Department of
Agriculture (USDA). 55
FDA's role as a market facilitator for agribusiness complicates the
integrity of its regulatory scheme.56 The FDA requires advance notice of
the marketing of GMOs and evidence that the GMO is as safe as its
conventional counterpart 57 In the articles in its outreach magazine, the
FDA consistently bolsters an analogy between Gregor Mendel's cross-
bred peas with the current practice of splicing the genetic properties of
unrelated species to enhance the performance of a plant. 58 Under the
U.S. system, agribusiness is free to develop produce with novel qualities
and avoid expensive separate regulatory treatment by retaining the nutritional
values of a conventional product. 59 The resulting is essentially a smell
test system for evaluating food safety, where any potentially harmful
changes may go unnoticed as under-the-surface properties.
53. See Kolehmainen, supra note 16, at 269-70.
54. See generally Center for Genetics and Society, http://geneticsandsociety.org
(advocating biotechnology policies that are responsive to moral concerns).
55. E.U. Commissioner for the Environment, Margot Wallstrom. has observed that
"[p]art of the explanation may be connected with the greater regulatory transparency in
the United States and hence greater public trust in the process." Brian P. Rafferty, The
Door Opens Slightly: Recent European Union Regulations on Genetically Modified
Products and the Ongoing United States European Union GM Product Dispute, 16
GEO. INT'L INVIL. L. REv. 281, 289 (2004).
56. The FDA lists "helping to speed innovations that make medicines and foods
more effective, safer, and more affordable" in its Mission Statement. U.S. Food and
Drug Admin., FDA's Mission Statement. http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/
mission.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
57. Raymond Formanek Jr., Proposed Rules Issued for Bioengineered Foods. FDA
CONSUMER, Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 11. Focus groups on labeling GM foods resulted in
consumers wanting to know why foods were genetically engineered, leading the FDA to
discourage labeling foods as "genetically modified." Id. at 10.
58. See generally Linda Bren, Genetic Engineering: The Future of Foods?. FDA
CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 28; Larry Thompson, Are Bioengineered
Foods Safe?. FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 18, 19. "Ever since the latter part of the
19th century, when Gregor Mendel discovered that characteristics in pea plants could be
inherited, scientists have been improving plants by changing their genetic makeup." Id.
at 19.
59. Olivier Cadot & David Vogel. France, the United States, and the Biotechnology
Dispute, Jan. 2001, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/biotech.htm.
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American agribusiness is heavily invested in the future of biotechnology.6 °
A pioneer in this field was Calgene, which presented a tomato with
61
reversed ripening genes for early picking and long shelf life in 1994.
Since then, the majority of soybean, corn, and cotton fields in the United
62States have been planted with GM seeds. Monsanto, a leader in GMO
development, has marketed its Roundup Ready soybean for its increased
63tolerance for herbicide sprays. GMO producers argue that the importance
of their enhanced products can be seen in the third world, where the
seeds can have remedial effects on uneven agricultural returns and world
hunger.64 The flip side is that the excess yield of these GMOs tends to
wind up on the market in underdeveloped countries, where the increased
supply drives prices down and hurts small scale farmers.65
B. Europe: Skeptical of Regulation, Protective of Culture
The E.U. has been leery of the purported benefits of GMOs. One
theory has linked the cultural memory of a long struggle with European
famines to an unwillingness to accept GMOs into the food supply. 66 The
visceral public reaction against GMOs in the market is also considered
to be an effect of European pride in food quality and culinary heritage. 7
Resisting the whitewashing effect of globalization and the extraordinary
reach of American tastes and products, Europe has responded with
efforts the United States deems protectionist.
68
60. See Cummins, supra note 48, at 1.
61. FDA Backgrounder, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition. Biotechnology of Food (May 18. 1994). http://www. cfsan.fda.
gov/Ird/biotechn.html.
62. Factsheet, Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. Genetically Modified
Crops in the United States (Aug. 2004), http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/
display.php3?FactsheetlD 2.
63. Monsanto US Ag Products, Roundup Ready Soybeans, http://www.monsanto.
com/monsanto/agproducts/input traits/products/roundupreadysoybeans.asp (last visited
Sept. 18, 2008).
64. Monsanto Company. Oniang'O Sees Urgent Need for Food Biotechnology in
Africa: Food Biotechnology Can Help Small Scale Farmers Increase Food Production
and Alleviate Hunger, http://www.monsanto.com/biotech-gmo/asp/experts.asp?id Ruth
Oniango#mid (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
65. Lawrence Kojo Tsimese. Dumping GMOs in Africa, 32 SYNTHESIS/
REGENERATION, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.greens.org/s-r/32/32-05.html.
66. Darren Smits & Sean Zaboroski, GMO's: Chumps or Champs of International
Trade?, I ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 111, 117 (2001).
67. See Rafferty. supra note 5. at 295.
68. Protecting Names May Not Work, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2003, at 49.
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Central to the E.U.'s defense of restricting imports of GMOs is its
69adherence to the precautionary principle. In justifying restrictions on
GMOs, the E.U. leans heavily on the precautionary principle's authorization
for action where scientific certainty is lacking. The principle emphasizes
dangerous uncertainty over known scientific risks.7" While scientists
believe that GMOs could create new allergens and toxins in human
bodies, cross-breed with conventional plants, and threaten biodiversity,
the short history of GMOs in the environment has failed to produce
conclusive results upon which the E.U. can rely. 7 1 The E.U. has resorted
to using import moratoriums to protect its borders and raise awareness of
the unknowable consequences of GMOs.
V. DIFFERENT APPROACHES To REGULATION
A. Process-based Approach
The disparate treatment of GMOs in the United States and Europe is
based on a product vs. process assessment 72 In 1990, Europe emphasized
its concern with any product that contained genetic modifications with
the passage of legislation that specifically required risk testing and
government consent. 3 This has required the member states of the E.U.
to regulate laboratories where GMOs are tested, and allowed national
governments to attempt to impose their own restrictions on the
percentage of foreign genes in any given product.74 Currently, the
European Community has imposed a maximum level of 0.9% of genetic
modification in unlabeled products. 75 The emphasis of Europe's "process"
system of regulation depends heavily on product testing and the
traceability of genetic modifications.
69. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J.
(C310) 1, 109 [hereinafter European Constitution] (adopting the precautionary principle).
70. Alexander G. Haslberger. Monitoring and Labeling for Genetically Modified
Products, 287 SCIENCE 431, 432 (2000).
71. Strauss, supra note 3. at 169 170.
72. Kim JoDene Donat, Engineering Akerlof Lemons: Information Asymmetry,
Externalities, and Market Intervention in the Genetically Modified Food Market, 12
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 417, 427 (2003).
73. Council Directive 90/220, On the Deliberate Release into the Environment of
Genetically Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117), 10 (EEC).
74. Italy to "Go it Alone" on GM Seed Thresholds, AGRA EUROPE, Oct. 10, 2003,
at EP/4, available at LEXIS 109086129.
75. Council Regulation 1829/2003, On Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003
O.J. (L 268) 12.
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B. Product-Based Approach
In contrast, the United States looks at the safety of the finished
product. Having adopted a "product" method of assessment, the FDA
evaluates all foods with the same safety standards, regardless of genetic
modification. 6 The standards against which GMOs are judged are their
conventional counterparts for "substantial equivalence., 77 Assuming
a genetically engineered tomato has the same nutritional qualities as a
conventional tomato, it will pass inspection in the United States without
reference to the amount of foreign genetic material that may have been
spliced to improve its shelf life, color, firmness, or hardiness to
pesticides. The impact these new properties have on human health will
not, ordinarily, be separately considered or evaluated, nor will the
environmental impact of its presence in crop fields be examined.78
As there is no special emphasis in the United States on testing GMOs,
the modified products enter the market undifferentiated from the
standard-setting, conventional products. 79 The result is that unwitting
consumers who have no choice in what foods arrive in their communities,
and who know nothing of the potential health and environmental risks of
these "Frankenfoods" purchase the products. 80 As disputes between the
United States and the E.U. have garnered publicity, the American public
has begun to understand that their foods are bioengineered and has
expressed interest in increased regulation.81
76. See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Biotechnology Facts (Sept. 2006), http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Agriculture/Biotechnology/asset upload file312_8907.pdf.
77. The Food and Drug Administration assesses the safety of GMOs according to
the following: "A safety assessment is characterized by an assessment of a whole food or
a component thereof relative to the appropriate conventional counterpart: A) taking into
account both intended and unintended effects: B) identifying new or altered hazards; C)
identifying changes, relevant to human health, in key nutrients." U.S. Food and Drug
Admin.. Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology,
CAC/GL 44-2003 (adopted 2003), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/biotechm.html#reg
(follow "Principles for the risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology"
hyperlink under "International").
78. See Strauss. supra note 3, at 174.
79. Id. at 168.
80. Id. at 189 90.
81. Memorandum from The Mellman Group and Public Opinion Strategies on
Genetically Modified Food (Nov. 7, 2005). http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Public Opinion/Food and Biotechnology/2005summaiy.pdf (showing that
only 41% of Americans are aware that GMOs are sold in supermarkets, but 61% favor
the government determining if such products are safe before they can be sold to the public).
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As a public health matter, there have been calls for mandatory
regulation and labeling of GMOs.82 Efforts by Representative Dennis
Kucinich (D-OH) to raise lawmaker awareness of the risks posed by
gaps in regulation have resulted in unpromising committee review.83
The five bills put forth by Representative Kucinich on the GMO issue
highlight the various shortcomings of current U.S. regulations: the need
for labeling; 84 environmental risks taken on by farmers using GMO
seeds and animals;85 the need for an analysis of the safety of GMOs, and
the right of citizens to bring suit for failure to comply with safety
provisions; 86 the danger of exporting GMOs to countries without their
knowledge or approval; 87 and the need to hold biotech companies liable
for environmental damage caused by the release of GMOs. 88 Where
Congress has been unwilling to take such aggressive action opposite
agribusiness and life sciences industries, state legislatures have begun to
lead.89 While many of the bills introduced at the state level are supportive
of GMO technology, a more significant portion reflect public skepticism,
with efforts to establish moratoria, increase regulation, or require labeling. 90
C. Public Awakening
1. Voluntary Labeling
The FDA has allowed agribusiness and life science companies to
respond to consumer concerns through a program of voluntary labeling.91
Food labeling rules in the United States are not extensive, but they
prohibit misleading statements.92 This includes omitting material facts
from a food label.93 In terms of labeling GMOs, what constitutes a
82. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 4814, 107th Cong.
(2002) [hereinafter Right to Know Act].
83. See Strauss. supra note 3, at 187.
84. Right to Know Act, supra note 82.
85. Genetically Engineered Crop and Animal Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 4812,
107th Cong. (2002).
86. Genetically Engineered Food Safety Act. H.R. 4813. 107th Cong. (2002).
87. Real Solutions to World Hunger Act, H.R. 4815, 107th Cong. (2002).
88. Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act, H.R. 4816, 107th Cong.
(2002).
89. The Pew Charitable Trusts, State Legislative Activity Related to Agricultural
Biotechnology Continue to Grow in 2005-2006, Factsheet, May 2005, available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/news room detail.aspx?id 18028.
90. Id.
91. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR
HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING. (January 2001), http://www.cfsan.
fda.gov/-dms/biolabgu.html [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].
92. Federal Food, Drug. and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301, 343 (2000).
93. Id.
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material difference is complicated by the fact that the FDA does not
perceive genetic modifications to be meaningful if the food passes the
substantial equivalence test.94 The material facts that must be included
in GMO food labels are altered nutritional values and unexpected
allergens. 95 Where a product is the substantial equivalent of its conventional
relative, no notice need be given to the consumer of the alterations or the
circumstances of the food's origins.9 6
The FDA has provided guidance on the voluntary labels producers
may opt for when there are no material facts to disclose. There is a
consistent theme running through the examples the agency provides: a
voluntary label should highlight the positive purpose of the genetic
modification. The FDA also encourages producers to use the consumer-
friendly word "biotechnology" over "genetic modification" or "genetic
engineering," citing focus group responses to the terms.97 Additionally,
the FDA prohibits simplistic statements on labels, such as "GMO free"
on several grounds. First, the FDA asserts that consumers do not understand




Second, the Agency argues that labels advertising a lack of bioengineering
have a chance of being misleading. 99 It also points out that most foods
have undergone crop cultivation, which constitutes genetic modification.'00
The FDA relies on its own lack of threshold designations and testing
requirements to explain that it cannot ensure that conventional products
are "GMO free."'' 1  Its suggestions for labels disclaiming GMOs are
straightforward and prohibit any connotation of better safety, vis-A-vis a
94. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 91.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (using "[t]his product contains high oleic acid soybean oil from soybeans
developed using biotechnology to decrease the amount of saturated fat" as an example of





A statement that a food is "free" of bioengineered material may be difficult to
substantiate without testing. Because appropriately validated testing methods
are not currently available for many foods, it is likely that it would be easier to
document handling practices and procedures to substantiate a claim about how
the food was processed than to substantiate a "free" claim.
Id.
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foods' GMO counterpart. 102 Curiously, a definition of the term that
consumers are so comfortable with-biotechnology-is undefined in the
FDA's materials on labeling. These guidelines also fail to educate the public
about the process by which biotechnology alters the food supply, and its
potential effects on the environment. By disallowing food producers'
conclusive statements on the safety of foods, the FDA has retained power in
the pubic eye and, in fact, over the determination of food safety.
2. Europe's Reporting Requirements
European attention has been focused on the issue of GMO safety even
prior to the marketing of the first genetically modified food.10 3 Since
then, the E.U. has passed legislation aimed at aggressively informing the
public of GMOs' presence and environmental impact.1 14 Specifically,
Council Directive 2001/18 authorizes a series of actions when a GMO is
poised to enter the market: a notification procedure, a period of public
comment, an assessment report, and the promulgation of principles for
determining environmental risk." 5 The directive also sets forth a uniform
labeling requirement for products with GMOs to read: "This product contains
genetically modified organisms. ' '1 °6 Directive 2001/18 distinguishes its
goals and constituencies from those of the FDA by explicitly referring to
the sensitivity of the environment in accepting and spreading new species.10 7
The most novel, and controversial, provisions of Council Directive
2001/18 allow for evidence of human health or environmental risks to
impose a moratorium on GMOs. 10 8 The failure of the United States to
differentiate its GMO exports from its conventional products was ill-
received in Europe, where mandatory labeling and GMO trace testing was
already in place.1° 9 The result was a temporary ban in Europe, under
102. Id. (using "[o]ur tomato growers do not plant seeds developed using biotechnology"
as an example of an acceptable voluntary label).
103. See Council Directive 90/220, supra note 73 (enacted four years prior to the
appearance of the FLAVR SAVR tomato, a product of Calgene).
104. Council Directive 2001/18, On the Deliberate Release Into the Environment of
Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001
O.J. (L106).
105. Id. art. 13.
106. Id. art. 13 § 2.
107. Id. cl. (4).
108. Id. art. 20, § 2, reads:
If new information has become available, from the users or other sources, with
regard to the risks of the GMO(s) to human health or the environment after the
written consent has been given, the notifier shall immediately take the
measures necessary to protect human health and the environment, and inform
the competent authority thereof.
109. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 181.
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Council Directive 2001/18, of GMO imports from 2003 to 2004.110 A
host of countries that follow the U.S.'s lead on GMO policy responded
to the ban with a successful World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint
on the grounds that the ban constituted a barrier to trade. " Prior to the
2006 ruling of the WTO, the E.U. recognized that its position was
untenable by passing Regulation 641/2004, which established rules for
the authorization of new GMOs in the market. " 
2
3. The Cartagena Protocol
In the background of these state regulations is the recent adoption of
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 113 The focus of the Cartagena
Protocol is the regulation of living modified organisms, such as plants
and animals, and their effects on biodiversity.1 4 The protocol also highlights
the disorganization of information about GMOs by establishing a Biosafety
Clearing-House to "[f]acilitate the exchange of scientific, technical,
environmental, and legal information on, and experience with, living
modified organisms..." 1 15 The Cartagena Protocol is explicitly limited
to the regulation of live modified organisms, which it defines as having
the capacity to transmit genetic material1 6 thus specifically excluding from
its purview the conflicts over GMOs in food.1 17 However, the adoption of
110. E.U. GMO Ban was Illegal, WTO Rules, EuRAcTIV.COM, May 12, 2006,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-gmo-ban-illegal-wto-rules/article-155197 [hereinafter
EuRAcTIV.COM].
111. Id. The United States, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico,
and New Zealand challenged the fairness of the E.U. temporary moratorium as an invalid
barrier to trade. Id.
112. Id. See also Commission Regulation 641/2004, On Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the
Council as Regards the Application for the Authorization of New Genetically Modified
Food and Feed, the Notification of Existing Products and the Adventitious or
Technically Unavoidable Presence of Genetically Modified Material which has
Benefited from a Favourable Risk Evaluation, 2004 O.J. (L 102).
113. Cartagena Protcol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,
2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 20.
116. Id. art. 3(g), (h).
117. World Health Org., Modern Food Biotechnology, Human Health and
Development: An Evidence-Based Study 19 20. available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/
publications/biotech/biotech en.pdf.
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this protocol by over 130 countries signals an international consensus on
the potential environmental perils of unregulated genetic modification.' 1 8
V1. DISPUTES
A. The WTO
The central contention in the trade disputes over GMOs has been
whether states have a valid scientific basis for their restrictive actions. 19
This emphasis is drawn from the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)." 2 The SPS
Agreement is relevant to GMO trade disputes because it governs the
protective measures states can employ in protecting human and plant
life.
12 1
The response to Europe's 2003 moratorium on GMO imports was
severe. Three complaints were filed in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body, to adjudicate the merits of the E.U. position. 22  The result,
predictably, was to favor the GMO exporters' argument that the E.U.
had failed to satisfy the SPS Agreement requirement for a scientific
basis for its moratorium. 123 Critics have derided the decision for failing
to consider the unknowable consequences of a new technology.1
24
Another significant criticism is that the WTO is the wrong body to be
handling disputes on sensitive environmental topics.125 The adoption of
118. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Oceans & Int'l Envtl. & Scientific Affairs, Fact
Sheet. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (July 21. 2003). http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/
factsheets/biosafety.asp.
119. This theme is articulated in both the GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY from the FDA,
supra note 91, and Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 104, which require evidence of
unforeseeable consequences before restrictive action can be taken.
120. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 2 §2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493, states: "Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phystosanitary measure
is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is
based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,
except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5." Art. 5, § 7 provides for provisional
measures when sufficient scientific information is unavailable. Id.
121. Id.
122. Complaint by the United States, WT/DS291/23 (2003). Complaint by Canada,
WT/DS292/17 (2003). Complaint by Argentina, WT/DS293/17 (2003). These complaints
were considered and ruled on together, Panel Report, supra note 1.
123. See Panel Report. supra note 1. See also WTO. Key Facts, Summary of the
Dispute to Date, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds291 e.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2008).
124. See Greenpeace European Unit, Say No to Genetic Engineering, http://www.
greenpeace.org/eu-unit/campaigns/say-no-to-genetic-engineering (last visited Sept. 19,
2008) (arguing that the environmental impacts will be discovered after remediation is
possible).
125. See EuRACTIV.COM, supra note 110.
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the Cartagena Protocol lends support to this argument. The creation of
the Biosafety Clearing-House under the protocol clearly announces the
need for greater scientific and legal understanding of GMOs, which, by
implication, is lacking in other international bodies. In contrast, the
WTO, lacking any scientific expertise, regularly determines the sufficiency
of scientific data in adjudicating disputes. The WTO does not specialize
in interpreting the SPS Agreement, a treaty that was adopted to fortify
national efforts to protect the environment. The concept of creating
environmental safeguards through the apparatus of trade is ill-founded.
B. European Disputes
Disputes within the European Union have predictably been settled in
favor of a precautionary approach in distributing GMOs. 26 Member states
are responsible for implementing controls consistent with E.U. directives,
such as Council Directive 2001/18. However, uniform systems are not
required and each state can exercise a veto over the importation of E.U.
approved GMOs.127 France was instrumental in using these vetoes to
implement the de facto moratorium on GMOs that led to the WTO
disputes. 128 This behavior is particularly controversial where a GMO has
successfully passed the E.U. environmental and safety tests required
under Council Directive 1829/2003.129 Refusing to allow a "safe" product
to enter the market relies on an argument couched in state sovereignty,
and acts as an explicit challenge to the validity of E.U. laws. The
European Court of Justice has ruled, in previous cases between states,
that a member state is free to independently restrict GMOs on a
temporary basis when it provides substantial scientific support of health
or environmental risk. 130 This focus on scientific evidence is consistent
with the WTO's interpretation of the SPS Agreement, but it has proven
to be more permissive in allowing member states to invoke the
precautionary principle in presenting their scientific evidence.
1 31
126. Court Rules in Favor of Restricting Suspect GMOs, CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY.
Sept. 15, 2003, at 4.
127. Donat. supra note 72. at 429.
128. Press Release, ECJ, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-6/99, Association
Greenpeace France and Others v. Ministere de I 'Agriculture et de la Peche and Others
(Mar. 21, 2000), http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cpOO/aff /cp 0018en.htm.
129. See id.
130. CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY, supra note 126.
131. The Italian government was successful at the ECJ in forcing Monsanto to label
food containing GMOs. See Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italio v. Presidenza
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In 2000, the European Court of Justice first gave member states the
leeway to regulate GMOs independently in Greenpeace v. Ministere
declaring that national governments have the first decision in whether a
GMO can enter the market. 132 A member state receives an application to
distribute a GMO from a food developer and can either approve or
disapprove the application unilaterally. The Court validated this process
by affirming that national authorities are qualified to assess the health
and environmental risks posed by a particular GMO. 133 If it foregoes a
veto at this stage, the application is passed on to the European Community,
where the precautionary principle is the official standard for evaluating
the application. 34 Relying on the due diligence of the initial accepting
state in assessing risks, the European Community will broadly accept the
GMO unless another state, having done its own risk assessment, protests.
1 35
Member states can reject a GMO after Community authorization, and
effectively force another review of it if there is new information about its
health and environmental effects at the Community level.
136
The underlying facts of the Greenpeace case centered on whether an
initial authorization by a member state, which was then forwarded to the
European Community at large, could be annulled after Community
137
approval. France had been approached with an application for a
genetically modified strain of maize, which it approved and forwarded to
the European Community. 13' After the E.C. gave authorization to distribute
the maize throughout Europe, Greenpeace lobbied to have the French
authorization annulled. 139 The French court agreed with Greenpeace, but
submitted the matter to the E.C.J. on the question of whether it had the
discretion to act counter to a European Community order. 14 The Court
responded that approving a GMO application and sending it up for
Community approval binds the initial country to permit the goods to be
distributed.1 41  Thus, France could not act to ban the maize it had
del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8105.




135. Press Release, ECJ, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-6/99,
Association Greenpeace France and Others v. Ministere de I 'Agriculture et de la Peche




138. Id. France requested that the E.C.J. determine what liberties a Member State
could take with regards to asserting its veto after the fact, and what effects that would
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recommended after receiving Community approval without presenting
new scientific information about risk factors. 142
The Greenpeace decision is significant in that it limits the opportunity
to apply the precautionary principle to a GMO. Each state has an
absolute right to initially reject an application for any reason. Once a
GMO passes through the requirements of one member country then, it is
evaluated by the European Community at large for precautionary principle
concerns. If the organism is approved for wide distribution, that decision
can only be challenged in the E.C.J. by a showing of new information
that would significantly affect a precautionary principle analysis of the
health and environmental risks posed by the GMO. This higher evidentiary
threshold for post-approval challenges reflects the presumptions inherent
in the precautionary principle that: unknown risks can be avoided by
failure to invite them, and heightened scientific certainty about risks
diminishes the attractiveness of inaction. 143 The policy is significantly
deferential to the concerns of the member states in that it assumes each
country is capable of evaluating those risks, and demands a new evaluation
of the GMO by the European Community upon any new information
provided to it by a state.144
An E.C.J. decision settling a dispute between Italy and Monsanto now
permits deference to a member state in deciding to temporarily ban an
approved GMO in light of new information. 145 This decision, however,
implements the "substantial equivalence" test used in the United States
for approving GMO food.146 The dispute arose when traces of GMO
corn were found in processed foods previously approved as substantially
equivalent to conventional corn products.147 A designation of substantial
equivalence signals that a substance has no health risk, allowing it to
enter the market without wading through the GMO application process
at issue in Greenpeace.148 After a strain of Monsanto Bt-corn entered
the market, Italian scientists detected traces of GMOs and questioned
142. Id.
143. See Cartagena Protocol, supra note 113, arts. 15, 16.
144. Press Release, ECJ, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-6/99, supra
note 128.
145. Press Release, ECJ. Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-236/01,
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whether the modified corn was safe, leading to a "precautionary suspension"
of its distribution in Italy.1 49 Monsanto challenged the independent ban
by Italy as counter to E.C. law.1 50 The Italian court turned to the E.C.J.
to rule on the question of whether a substance with traceable amounts of
transgenic properties properly fit within the category of substantially
equivalent foods, and whether it was appropriate that organisms with trace
elements should be allowed to enter the market through the simplified
process accorded such foods.1 51 The E.C.J. resolved this issue by ruling
that differences between a conventional product and a GM product
would not destroy a GMO's substantial equivalence to its conventional
counterpart. However, a member state could determine the substantial
equivalence of a given organism by evaluating its risk to public
health.1 52  The Court also ruled that the substantial equivalence
method of bypassing the GMO approval process did not represent a
lower safety standard for such foods.1 53 It suggested that foods with
traces of GMOs ought to be properly labeled as required under the
law. 1 54 The Court again emphasized that information causing a state to
question the purported safety of a GMO on the market could be used as
grounds to institute a temporary ban on the product, and force a secondary
review of that product by the E.C.1 55
By preserving the rights of member states to act independently, the
Court in Monsanto effectively dampened the ability of food companies
to slip GMOs into Europe in sheep's clothing. The cover of "substantial
equivalence," which works in the United States for introducing GMOs
that are presumed to be innocuous, is not guaranteed in Europe. The
goal of wider consumption may not, in fact, be the guaranteed outcome: a
label on each unit alerts reluctant European consumers of the content of
the item, and prompts scientists, such as the ones in Italy, to question its
safety. The E.C.'s refusal to step in on behalf of the GMO distributor in
defending "substantial equivalence" serves as a nod toward state sovereignty
within the E.C., and to the precautionary principle. Without allowing





153. Id. The E.C.J. noted that the GMO regulations have two objections: "to ensure
the functioning of the internal market in novel foods, and to [] protect public health." Id.
This dual function of the Council Directives as advocating for public health and
facilitating the market mirrors the role of the FDA in the United States. See U.S. Food
and Drug Admin., FDA's Mission Statement, supra note 56.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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labels to certain GMOs might raise the presumption that these items
have not had the benefit of a skeptical eye.
The regulatory regimes at the international level and within the
European Union differ substantially on how to sufficiently support a
GMO ban. The WTO starts from the premise that a GMO is safe, and
only "detailed scientific evidence" can warrant a temporary ban. It
draws the requirement of scientific evidence from the SPS Agreement, a
high threshold for evaluating health and environmental impact. Such a
requirement is analogous to a canary in a coal mine: states are expected
to go down an uncertain and possibly dangerous path without information,
and retreat is permitted only when there is demonstrable evidence of
danger-the equivalent of a dead canary. The WTO has resisted the
precautionary measures by countries unwilling to take the health and
environmental risks that more cavalier states greet with permissive
regulations.
The E.C.J. has been clear that the focus of the inquiry never strays far
from observance of the precautionary principle. Permitting a GMO to
enter the market is a question, not the default rule. The significance of
allowing individual states to pass upon applications prior to E.C. review
signals respect for the unique values of the member states, while
providing a guaranty that the applications reaching committee review are
relatively benign. Subsequent objections by other member states reflect
the concern that precautionary needs differ from region to region. New
information raised to challenge a GMO need not rise to the level of
detailed scientific evidence; it need only be sufficient to change the
outcome of a precautionary evaluation of the GMO. The effect of such
an open-door policy for evaluating the safety of these organisms is that
potential side effects can be discussed and hypothecated before research
and experience develop a full story.
The difference between the WTO and E.C.J. systems illustrates the
fundamental dispute over whether to adjudicate GMOs as a trade or an
environmental issue. The presence of multinational food companies
promoting their newest creations in every possible market, and the lack
of an international body dedicated to settling environmental problems
between countries, has placed cases dealing with resistance in the lap of
the WTO, whose mission is to promote free trade. The problem is that
trade issues are not the gravamen of the complaints that arrive at the
WTO: states are not asking for decisions regarding dumping or other
anti-competitive practices. The basis for GMO bans have been aimed at
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protecting delicate environmental and public health systems, yet the SPS
Agreement binds the WTO to make blunt rulings requiring scientific
certainty. Without the power to act cautiously and discriminately,
biological diversity and human resistance to allergens may suffer at the
hand of capitalism and free trade, powered by an international system
that values market access for corporations more than it values market
integrity.
VII. WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEMS
A. Labeling
The crux of the argument between Europe and the United States
amounts to a trade issue for the United States, and a health and environmental
issue for Europe. The United States has resisted labeling because conscious
European consumers would be able to make educated decisions about
the American goods on sale, particularly about the profitable processed
foods that are loaded with GMOs. In contrast, Europe has become highly
sensitive to food origins and treatment. Their demands for information
have grown out of public crises involving Mad Cow disease and invasive
species decimating traditional environmental balance and crops.
Regulating consumer products became mandatory in the United States
in the early twentieth century in order to protect the consuming public
from dangerous foods and drugs. 156 Oversight was necessary to mitigate
the health risks posed by drug companies and traveling medicine men
advertising and pawning their concoctions to a trustful public. 5  The
availability of drugs was unmonitored, leading consumers to be unwittingly
exposed to substances such as opium, heroin, and cocaine.' 58 The
FDA notes that information about drugs was limited to that obtained
through bitter experience. 159
Ironically, labeling in the United States came about through the action
of women's groups adopting a "pure food" campaign. 16 Under pressure
from a public convinced by the efforts of the pure food ladies, the FDA
adopted regulations limiting the use of preservatives and chemicals only
as necessary, and requiring that the producer prove a product's
156. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA
CONSUMER, June 1981, at 32.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 35. Labeling of drugs was often limited to names such as "Kick-a-poo
Indian Sagwa' without indicating the presence of intoxicating substances. This "reflected
both the limited medical capability of the period and public acceptance of the doctrine
that the buyer could and should look out for himself." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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safety.161 Interestingly, this is exactly the opposite approach taken by
the FDA in regulating GMOs. Genetic modifications are assumed to be
safe, unless proven otherwise by consumer reaction or the patent presence
of toxins, such as in Starlink TM corn. The premise of this policy is that,
by and large, naturally occurring substances are safe for human consumption
and do not require vetting on a case-by-case basis. This, again, creates a
de facto regulatory vacuum, where consumers operate in a state of caveat
emptor, and only learn that certain genetic material is toxic to them by
an unexpected allergic reaction.
The weakness of the American position in resisting labeling requirements
by European markets is its inconsistency with its closely-held values.
Consumer education, transparency, and guarding public health have
long been embraced in the United States, often with more urgency and
effectiveness than within Europe. Failure to label GM foods serves none
of these public interests, and aligns the FDA with the drug companies
that design, patent, and market the foods with less oversight, especially
when compared to their pharmaceutical counterparts.
B. Regulations
Europe has adopted a regulation system that seems to address
American concerns about barriers to trade with its own health and
environmental concerns. As the E.U. has been slowly changing its
regulatory framework to mirror the substantial equivalence test in the
United States, new products, such as corn, have been introduced for marketing
in the E.U. without resistance. 162 In fact, reports have emerged indicating
that farmers in France, the most vocal critics and staunch resisters of GM
foods, have been clamoring for GM seed varieties because of their superior
quality and yield.1 63 Europe's system allows for the use of seeds
evaluated for substantial equivalence with conventional goods, including
their environmental effects, while still requiring informative labels that
address consumer rights.
161. Id. The standoff between agricultural and health interests on one side, and
proponents of laissez faire goverment on the other, was tipped with the support of
women's organizations and the publication of Upton Sinclair's THE JUNGLE.
162. AFX News Limited, EU Authorizes Three GMO Maize Types for Marketing in
EU After Monsanto Requests, Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/business/feeds/
afx/2006/01/13/afx2448147.html.
163. Sybille de La Hamaide, French Farmers Say GMO Ban Harmful, REUTERS
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7. 2007, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/
idUKL0314440620071003 (last visited Jan. 3, 2008).
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The European GMO approval process is, compared to the American
system, cautious to the point where every participant has significant
power to exert its will. The Greenpeace and Monsanto cases reiterate
that every member state is deemed capable of scientifically evaluating
the effects of a GMO, and contribute to the application of the
precautionary principle. The lack of a unified process or a consolidated
agency to evaluate proposed GMOs creates the risk that every state
receiving a GMO application will act independently to disproportionately
influence the entire European community. It is certain that each state's
actions will be based on their unique prejudices and predispositions
toward issues of the environment, trade, and health. While this gives the
E.U. the advantage of having more diverse minds evaluate GMOs and
their probable effects, the process is also susceptible to hijacking by
interest groups or countries that do not provide objective analysis. In
contrast with the American FDA, manufacturers of GMOs have limited
opportunities to work in tandem with European regulators. The strength
of public opinion opposing GMOs in Europe further pits the goals of
regulators and facilitators of new products against those of the developers of
GMOs. In cases where industry genuinely has better, safer products to
offer, the process of introducing them to the European market would be
hindered by the need to lobby every government and respond to criticisms
and research of varying seriousness and relevance.
VIII. TORT LAW OPTIONS
The process-based approach of regulating GMOs in Europe lends
itself toward developing expectations about the organism, and about
liability arising from its use, at the time it enters the market. The
manifestations of this front-end understanding are requirements that the
derivation process be disclosed and labeled, and the willingness and
ability of European countries to pull questionable items off the market.
By contrast, the United States does not make specific inquiries into a
GMO product when it is first introduced. Its use of the "substantial
equivalence" test equates, for all purposes, a GMO with the conventional
food item.
A. Consumer Expectations
In American tort cases, foods are subject to liability under the
consumer expectations test because they are relatively simple products
that consumers understand and know about.164 The Restatement (Third)
164. See Noah, supra note 43, at 55 n.252.
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of Torts takes the position that a seller is liable when a food contains a
harmful ingredient that a "reasonable consumer" would not expect to
find in food. 165 Liability attaches to a product when it poses an
"unreasonable danger," meaning that the risk of consuming the product
would not be anticipated by an ordinary purchaser. 66 Dangerous products
typically contain a manufacturing or design defect that the seller was in a
better position to know of, and provide warning to the consumer.161
When a consumer is injured by a product defect, the seller can be held
strictly liable for injuries. 168
The problems with using this test for GMO foods are manifold. First,
injuries resulting from the genetic modifications in food may not be
readily detected or linked to the substance that caused them. Second, the
personal injuries considered most likely to arise from GMOs-allergies-
will not necessarily win under a strict consumer expectations test. Many
consumers are aware that foods trigger allergic reactions, and that some
allergies develop over time in response to consumption patterns. That
expectation does not change merely because a product was developed in
a laboratory rather than naturally.
Last, the significant damage feared by introducing GM crops into the
environment could not be addressed using the consumer expectations
test. While individuals have standing in the United States to sue for
environmental damage, this is typically done through showing non-
compliance with a governmental regulation. 169 With genetically modified
crops, environmental impacts on conventional crops, biodiversity, soil,
and wildlife will be difficult to trace and take years to surface. By
the time any plaintiff is able to prove these effects, the damage will be
done and possibly irreversible. In the meantime, potential plaintiffs can
be effective only by influencing legislation and regulatory activities, and
monitoring growers for compliance with existing laws.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7 (1998).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, § 402A cmt. i (1965).
167. Id. § 402A cmt. c.
168. Id. § 402A.
169. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2000).
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B. Alternatives. Risk- Utility and Design Defect Tests
Some scholars have suggested that food be evaluated using the
traditional risk-utility test.' This test is commonly used by courts
seeking to evaluate whether a product contains such a dangerous defect
that it should not be marketed. 7 A risk-utility analysis requires a showing
that the cost of correcting a product defect would have been less than
assuming the risk of the defective product. 172 Imposing this test in food-
related tort litigation could sufficiently motivate GMO developers to fully
research alternative designs and the risks of injury to the consuming
public. As critics of the test point out, however, this pressure could result in
consumers suing food companies for their failure to engineer foods to
replace a conventional product carrying a normal risk of allergens and
other toxins. 173
The results of using the risk-utility test for food would be perverse.
Large companies, facing liability for not engineering their food, could
effectively put an end to wide distribution of natural foods. Smaller
farmers might be tempted to fill that gap in supply, but they would be at
the peril of defending expensive lawsuits for their use of natural seeds.
From a regulatory standpoint, the cost of switching to a risk-utility test
in the courtroom may eventually lead to calls for greater ex ante
regulation of food production. As risk-utility would tend to encourage
greater transparency in food research, development, and content, it
would also lead to the marketing of even more highly-processed substances.
Giving consumers an outlet to challenge the safety of natural foods and
the presence of naturally-occurring risks inherent to them may lead to
demand for "risk-free" foods. Such a menu would require extensive research
and engineering to eliminate side-effects and risk factors. The resulting
products would run counter to the interests of anti-GMO constituencies:
new, fully-evaluated and processed foods and plants would enter the
food supply and environment en masse, without any information on their
long-term effects.
The risk-utility test might also require a plaintiff to show that another
design of the product would be a reasonable and safer alternative to the
"defective" one that allegedly caused the plaintiff s injury. 17 4 The implication
is that any GMO food could be challenged with the evidence that a safe
170. See Katharine Van Tassel, The Introduction of Biotech Foods to the Tort
System: Creating a New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1645, 1647 (2004).
171. See Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195. 201 (Mont. 1986).
172. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984).
173. See Noah. supra note 43. at 56.
174. Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 1997).
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conventional product exists, and any natural product could be challenged
with the existence of a food better engineered for safety. Any engineer
or grower of food would be disincentivized, under this regime, from
experimenting with new cross-breeds or other genetic modifications.
New products would be guaranteed sources of litigation, with merciless
plaintiffs hauling in similar products that withstood the risk-utility test in
prior lawsuits as examples of "reasonable alternative designs." Worse,
the presence of a safe alternative to the defective product makes the new
design look like negligence by the manufacturer.' Some jurisdictions
have dealt with this problem by shifting the burden of proof that a
product is not defective to the defendant, but many courts require that
the plaintiff prove that the defective condition posed an "unreasonable
danger" to the consumer.116 As discussed above, a plaintiff may have
difficulty proving that an allergen or toxin is unreasonably dangerous
when found in a GMO food product, as they appear in the conventional,
or "safe," foods that a GMO would be compared to in such a case.
C. Failure to Warn in Labeling
Labeling GMOs is the most commonly called-for measure in the
debate over allowing these products into the supermarket. The idea of
giving consumers a choice over what food to consume-genetically
modified or not-is based on the idea that there are inherent risks in
consuming GM products. Labels and warnings are typically used by
manufacturers and sellers to communicate directions for safe use of a
product. 177 In the context of GMOs, labels would function to warn
consumers of possible allergens and other qualities that fail to conform
to consumer expectations.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts discusses the obligation to label
products made "under secret formula., 178 When the properties of a product
175. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 433 (1978) (lightening the
plaintiffs burden of proving negligence by a manufacturer in defect-design cases, by
moving the burden of proof to defendant in showing that the product is not defective).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND). supra note 166. at cmt. g. Generally, the plaintiff
must offer a safer alternative design in proving the unreasonable danger of the product.
Nunnally v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 869 So.3d 373. (Miss. 2004) (requiring plaintiff
to submit evidence proving the unreasonable danger posed by cigarettes). But see Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.. 8 Cal. 3d 121 (1972) (shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
on the risk-benefit test when the plaintiff is injured).
177. Id. § 397 cmt. b.
178. Id. § 397.
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are not manifested in its appearance or on its label, the user is deemed to
have relied on the seller's expertise in making the product safe for its
intended use. 179 The obligations underlying this liability are that the
seller use reasonable care in designing a safe product, and communicating
directions for safe use. 18° The Restatement sets the standard for
comprehending warning statements and knowledge of risks at that of
the ordinary user of a product, who is not expected to have in-depth
understanding of the properties of that product.181
A manufacturer may be liable to an injured plaintiff if the ingredients
listed on a label do not provide an ordinary consumer with enough
information to understand the properties of the product.1 82 Under the
current regulatory framework in the United States, GMOs do not need to
be labeled and are not differentiated in the market from conventional
products. Manufacturers may voluntarily label GMOs, but these labels
are limited to simplified statements notifying the consumer of the
presence of genetic modifications, not lists of formulas used to derive
the product. If anti-GMO activists succeed in pressuring the government
to require more stringent food labels, lists of exotic genes may not
adequately inform consumers of the foreign content they are consuming.
Inadequate GMO labeling has caused allergic reactions in the public
on two well-known occasions. As discussed above, genetically modified
soybeans entered the food supply without notice to consumers that they
were GMOs, and that they had been altered using genes from Brazil
nuts, a food commonly known to cause allergic reactions. 18 3 Secondly,
StarLink TM corn intended for use in animal feed entered processed food
intended for humans through a sequence of farmers, grain elevator
operators, and purchasers failing to label the corn as directed by the
federal government.1 84 Even after the grain community was informed by
the federal government that StarLink TM contained a toxin known to
cause violent allergic reactions and needed to be quarantined, reasonable
care was not exercised to identify the corn as a potential hazard, and
some allergic reactions did ensue.1 85
Assuming that StarLink TM corn had contained a detailed, formulaic
label, identifying the Bt strain that carried the toxin at issue, it is still unlikely
that allergic consumers would have avoided the product. Ordinary consumers
179. Id. § 397 cmt. b.
180. Id.
181. Id. § 397 cmt. c.
182. Id. § 397.
183. Kolehmainen, supra note 16, at 278. Institute for Food Research, Brazil Nut
Allergy. http://www.ifr.ac.uk/public/foodinfosheets/edpbrazil.html (stating that Brazil nuts are
the most common trigger of nut-related allergic reactions in the United Kingdom).
184. Brian O'Reilly, Reaping a Biotech Blunder. FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 156.
185. Id.
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will not be able to read ingredient lists with understanding unless the
genetic contents are listed with their origins or possible effects. This
would require a soybean label identifying Brazil nuts as an ingredient, or
a corn label listing Bt as known to cause allergic reactions. The effect
would be to wipe out the benefits to industry of the substantial equivalence
test, because everything would require a label. Although this labeling
promises to be burdensome to manufacturers, consumers have the more
difficult task of sorting through food that looks equivalent, but may have
added dangers.
IX. INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
The traditional institutions for resolving international disputes have
been roundly criticized for their insensitivity to environmental claims.
18 6
After a series of conventions on the need for an environmental court in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, an Italian Supreme Courtjudge introduced a
draft convention for the Establishment of an International Court for the
Environment that addressed the shortcomings of the international legal
system. 187 Shortly after this development, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) announced that a permanent panel of its judges would be
available, at the consent of the parties in a dispute, to adjudicate as a
Chamber of the Court for Environmental Matters (CEM).188 This panel,
however, does not resolve the inadequacies of the ICJ. The justices are
drawn from the ICJ and possess no special expertise in scientific or
environmental matters. Moreover, the panel cannot assert compulsory
jurisdiction over any dispute. 189 States might also point to a general anti-
186. See generally, Sean D. Murphy, Does the World Need a New International
Environmental Court, 32 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 333 (2000); see also Peggy
Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access
by Non-State Entities. 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191 (2001).
187. See Kalas, supra note 187, at 233 (quoting the 1992 Draft Statute of the
International Environmental Agency and the International Court of the Environment).
Under the Draft Statute, states would be held legally accountable to the international
community for domestic and extraterritorial environmental damage. Standing in such
lawsuits would not be limited to other states, but could be invoked by individuals and
NGOs as well. Id.
188. The CEM was formed pursuant to Article 26 of the ICJ Statute, which allows
the Court to "form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as the
Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases .... " Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 26.1, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031. The jurisdiction of
the court and the CEM is limited to states. Id. art. 34.
189. See Charles Qiong Wu, Development, A Unified Forum? The New Arbitration
Rules for Environmental Disputes Under the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 3 CHI. J.
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environmental bias in the ICJ, which would be unlikely to produce
favorable results to a party seeking to protect the environment in a
trade dispute.19° So it is not surprising that after nearly fifteen years of
existence, the Chamber has never been called upon to settle a dispute. 191
The problems of standing and compulsory jurisdiction are central to
the problem of creating any new adjudicatory forum for environmental
issues. The current international system rests on state sovereignty, which
denies NGOs and individuals access to the institutions that have been
ruling on the environmental policies that affect them. 192 In the United
States, the Alien Tort Claims Act has mediated the challenge of obtaining
jurisdiction over states or transnational companies involved in environmental
destruction, but the judiciary remains hesitant to adjudicate disputes that
have another available and appropriate forum. 93 With most criticism
of the current international forums being directed at the standing issue,
and with a general consensus that environmental progress will be made
only with the initiation and cooperation of environmental NGOs, 194 a
new acceptance of non-state actors as the mouthpieces of transnational
values must be recognized in any new dispute settlement body.
A. Alternative Forums
Two other entities have emerged as front-runners in the search for an
alternative to the WTO. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) sits
in The Hague under the auspices of the United Nations, and the International
Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation (ICEAC) works
INT'L L. 263, 265-66 (2002). Parties must request adjudication by the CEM. Statute of
the International Court of Justice, supra note 189, art. 26.3.
190. See Wu, supra note 190 (describing ICJ precedent that explicitly rejects using
"potential environmental harm" as a defense to avoiding a treaty).
191. The United Nations Environmental Programme describes the chamber on its
website, but notes that, "[a]s a practical matter, though, the ICJ's environmental cases
generally proceed through the standard ICJ process. and have yet to take advantage of
the specialised Chamber." U.N. Envtl. Programme [UNEP], Manual on Compliance with
and Enforcement of International Environmental Agreements, 172, U.N. Doc. DEC//0817/NA
(June 2, 1006), available at http://unep.org/dec/onlinemanual/Compliance/NegotiatingMEAs/
DisputeSettlementProvisions/Resource/tabid!661/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
192. See Kalas, supra note 187, at 191-92 (citing the difficulty for individual plaintiffs
to bring claims in national courts under theories of international environmental law).
193. Id. at 197-98. The greatest development in the use of the Alien Tort Claims
Act has been in addressing human rights violations: "the question remains whether the
human right to a healthy environment is recognized among nations to the extent to be
considered 'the law of nations.'" ld. at 199.
194. Conference, The George Washington University Law School Conference on
International Environmental Dispute Resolutions, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
325, 327 (2000). The unwillingness of states to initiate environmental claims in the ICJ
or the CEM may be due to their unwillingness to have their own environmental
regulations and practices examined and exposed. Id.
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out of offices in Mexico and Spain at the request of consenting parties.195
What is distinct about these forums as opposed to the ICJ and the WTO
is their emphasis on mediation and conciliation, their lack of compulsory
jurisdiction, and the extent to which the parties can be involved in choosing
the adjudicators and experts. 196
The different characteristics of these forums demonstrate why neither
of them fills the gaps that make the WTO and ICJ so imperfect. Where
the WTO and ICJ maintain an eminence associated with compulsory
jurisdiction and command traditional binding decisions overseen by an
inflexible panel of adjudicators, they are both unable to accommodate
the non-state actors who are crucial environmental advocates. These
compulsory forums are also more intimidating to the states that are brought
before them, who fear public disclosure and want to exercise more
control over the adjudicatory process and panelists. The PCA, while
voluntary for the parties, has the power to issue binding decisions, but
it provides little of the transparency that parties hope to achieve when
bypassing the WTO and ICJ. Its jurisdiction is limited to cases with one
state as a party, meaning that this forum is not conducive to individuals
or NGOs pursuing corporate polluters.'19
The ICEAC, on the other hand, has been called a precursor to a World
Court for the Environment.198 Its structure provides the flexible options
sought by states, individuals, and NGOs, except that it cannot compel
jurisdiction over the parties.' 99 It is available at the request of any person,
NGO, corporation, or state, and can facilitate multilateral disputes. 200 It
offers dispute resolution by conciliation and arbitration, and offers advisory
opinions on the use of different environmental protection solutions.20 '
195. Kalas, supra note 187, at 212 13.
196. Id.; see also Wu, supra note 190, at 264-65. The PCA provides parties with
lists of arbitrators and experts who have previous experience with environmental
disputes. The parties are free to employ these recommended experts or find their own.
Id. at 265.
197. Kalas, supra note 187, at 213. The culpability of transnational corporations in
environmental pollution is widely understood, but impossible to stop on a global level.
See id at 193. As GMOs have been systematically promoted abroad on a "testing
grounds" basis, claims that companies are taking advantage of the lack of regulation in
the third world will continue to arise.
198. Id. at 214.
199. Id.
200. Id. The necessity of including many actors in facilitating environmental solutions
has led to calls for more inclusive dispute resolution methods over the traditional two-
party, adversarial system. See Wu. supra note 190. at 264.
201. Kalas, supra note 187, at 214.
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Additionally, the members of its large panel of judges specialize in
environmental law, giving the ICEAC decisions the credibility of
impartial experts, over whom the parties have had no special input.20 2
The fact that this forum was created by lawyers and judges on a voluntary
basis to forge a new approach to settling environmental problems is an
explicit reproach to the traditional mechanisms offered through the




Input from scientists is conspicuously lacking from the development
of international trade law regarding GMOs. The WTO follows the SPS
Agreement in requiring detailed scientific evidence to support a restriction
on GMOs, but what qualifies as sufficiently detailed or scientific is not
well established through case law.2 °4 This obligation to show scientific
evidence also serves to disqualify well-researched theories from
consideration. As scientists become more adept at studying environmental
and biological systems, the inferences they can draw from the genetic
properties of newly designed foods will likely be more instructive of
long-term effects than any hard data derived in limited studies.
The most disturbing element of how the interests of GMO producers
and the environment are resolved is the context of the adjudication.
Starting from the premise that this is a trade issue, and working within
the framework of the WTO, does not give adequate attention to the
scientific issues that constitute half the disagreements. It is not surprising
that the WTO regularly rules in favor of countries advancing trade
interests, and against those advocating for environmental protection.
The international community needs a body, savvy to scientific methods
and arguments, to evaluate the claims of environmentalists and industry,
and to investigate the risks posed by new substances. As the consequences
of environmental degradation become better publicized and addressed
internationally, it is appropriate that an adjudicating body, learned in and
committed to environmental and health matters, be used to address
disputes that arise primarily because of those concerns. The ICEAC provides
202. Id.
203. Id. It has been proposed that corporations agree to jurisdiction in the ICEAC
or other voluntary bodies when they contract with states for investment opportunities.
Wu, supra note 190, at 267.
204. See Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italio, 2003 E.C.R. 1-810S.
Conflicting scientific evidence and theories regarding safety persuaded the court to allow
temporary restrictions on GMOs. Id.
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a good model of such a system, but a multinational treaty underlying it
would be required to compel jurisdiction.
B. Adherence to the Precautionary Principle
A significant cognitive barrier to resolving the approaches taken by
the American and European regulatory agencies is a disagreement over
application of the precautionary principle. Whereas Europe incorporates
it at every level of evaluation that a GMO undergoes before being
marketed, the United States fails to apply it at many levels. First, the
United States does not give end consumers the right to exercise the
precautionary principle independently, which could be achieved through
product labeling and user choice. Second, the substantial equivalence
test allows products onto the market when they are not fully understood,
which violates the call of the precautionary principle to reserve action
for circumstances where risks are known.
The risk of leaving GM foods to be regulated through a process of
injury and litigation is that new standards of proving product defect could
arise, damaging both an important industry and consumers. The United
States should seek to implement a new process resembling the European
system for evaluating GMOs. The hallmarks of such a system would be
calculating GM content, limiting the GM content of marketed goods,
labeling GM content for consumer protection, and close monitoring of the
substances. Creating a process that addresses the concerns of industry and
environmentalists would effectively create a middle ground for Europe
and America to work from. Resolving that central dispute between those
constituencies is essential to moving forward with an international
regime that regulates from the perspective of environmental protection,
not trade problems.
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